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Is Curriculum Integration Like
Miscegenation?
by
John H. Chambers
Tasmanian College of Advanced Education

At my last college in London, it was the practice for students to study
one subject for general educational purposes for three years and a second
subject for two years, this latter subject also having some connection with
subjects taught in the schools. One day at a staff meeting the deputy
principal argued that some secondary schools in London were already
engaged in inter-disciplinary and 'integrated' studies, that our college
should not only be preparing students for the actual world of schools
but should be leading in new ideas, and that therefore the college should
be teaching 'integrated' material to its students. His suggestion was that
one of the two-year subjects we offered should be of an 'integrated'
nature; to be called European Studies, it would enable us to draw upon
the discipline-knowledge and the staff that the college already possessed.
The historians could teach European history, the philosophers European
philosophy, the literature lecturers European literature, the geographers
European geography, the artists European art, and so on and so on. We
would, he thought, be getting the best of all possible worlds. His
suggestion was enthusiastically received and duly got underway despite the
reservations expressed from certain quarters. There were four-week units
on European history, ELiropean literature, European art .... At term's
end there were distinct rumblings of discontent from the students, and
the staff involved were having misgivings. Prior to a meeting to review
the progress of the course, I asked some of the students about their
feelings and received answers of the sort, "We get a bite of the cherry
and they take it from our mouths", "The work is too superficial" ,"What's
the real point of the course?" In truth, there was a great deal of discontent
and muddle and in the middle of the muddle the deputy left for a position
at one of Britain's ancient universities, while the staff struggled to give
life to his premature infant.
The moral of the story is, I suppose, that an important idea is liable
to be ruined by superficial understanding and misdirected enthusiasm.
After all, what was being 'integrated' in that Europea~ Studies course?
Was there inter-disciplinary (I-D for short) study gomg on? In what
sense was the study inter-disciplinary? Is 'Europe' a unifying concept
that has its meaning and significance written on its face? What was
there in comrrlOn among the different parts of the course? In what
epistemologically-useful way is a continent by itself a unifying feature
that provides meaning? The fault with this particular European Studies
course was that it was never made clear either what was being 'integrated'
or brought together in an I-D way with what possible results, or what
28

was the educational point of it all. Had such issues been examined I
assume that the course would have been approached in a rather differ;nt
way.
In this article I want to ask and to try to answer the question, 'In the
organization of the school curriculum, what do the words 'integration'
and 'inter-disciplinary' mean?' and to examine certain fundamental
epistemological issues in doing so. My answer will be quite tentative and
sketchy; I see it as merely the sort of initial move that must be made if
this very important area of curriculum concern is to be even superficially
understood. There may well be some even more epistemologicallyfundamental answers that also need to be sought, but what I', have to say
is, I believe, pointing at least in the right direction.
!.
Let me emphasize that I am talking about curriculum integration in the
school, i.e. about the content of courses, about the variety of learning
planned for children to acquire in the schools, not about methods used in
teaching or learning the content. (I'm not suggesting that the methods
used have no effect on the learning acquired. Of course there is an effect.
But if we are to be quite clear about what ought to go on in schools then
we must be fully aware of the conceptual distinction between the learning
that is to be acquired i.e. the curriculum, and the methods by which that
learning is brought about.) Nothing at all about so-called traditional or
progressive methods of teaching follows from what I say here. In this
sense of curriculum, traditional and progressive methods are equally
possible with any sort of curriculum. And connections between methods
and content will be logically contingent. Neither am I talking about some
kind of integrated problem-solving approach to working at the content of
the curriculum on the lines for instance of John Dewey's omnicompetent
model (Dewey, 1938). Furthermore, I am not talking about the time
organization of the school day. The term, 'integrated day' is sometimes
used to describe a flexibility of time organization, but I am not discussing
that here; so-called integrated days are equally possible with any sort of
curriculum. And I am not talking about the integrated understanding that
a chiid may acquire as a result of studying the various types of knowledge
that feature on a curriculum.
The term, 'I-D', despite its obvious complexity has some meaning.
I understand it as bringing together different disciplines (see next paragraph)
to focus on a topic of interest or to help solve a problem. In the I-D parts
of a curriculum various disciplines will be used to try to solve a problem
or to throw light upon a topic of interest. An I-D problem will be a
problem that requires an answer in the world of practical application, and
that requires more than one discipline to be brought to bear to solve it;
an I-D topic will be a topic of some intrinsic interest that requires more
than one discipline to understand it. Typical I-D problems will be town
planning, bridge building, educating children - indeed in educating
children there will be an unlimited number of problems whose solution
can only be achieved (to the extent that they can) through an I-D
app~oach. Typical I-D topics would include pollution, poverty, the
environment and war.
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By the term 'discipline' I mean a well-established, relatively discrete
subject with a recognizable conceptual scheme, a particular pattern of
enquiry and an accepted name. It is probably best to define a discipline
denotatively, by suggesting that history, literature, botany, psychology,
philosophy (or a sub-division of these, e.g. British history, Australian
literature, marine botany, Freudian psychology, philosophy of mind)
as studied in CAEs and universities are disciplines. A discipline will usually
be a branch of a form of knowledge (see below), but may also in a
complex way draw upon more than one form of knowledge. The ways in
which the concepts 'subject', 'discipline' and 'form of knowledge' are
inter-related is of course itself an interesting question into which it is not
possible to look in this article, except to say that the word 'subject' may
be merely a useful and general name for any area of the curriculum
bounded for the purpose of convenient study, and that subjects that
feature on school curricula mayor may not be disciplines in the above
sense and are usually not co-extensive with a form of knowledge as
described below; for instance, the subject mathematics, as usually taught
in a school, may involve aspects of historical or scientific study. It is not
merely a mathematical study in either a discipline sense or form- ofknowledge sense. It will be seen that I am in no way suggesting that a
discipline is a logically-fundamental division of knowledge. Nevertheless
it is clear that we do have paradigms of disciplines, for example, botany
or history as studied in CAEs and universities, and it is these paradigms
that will provide the meaning for the word, 'discipline' as used in the term,
'I-D' in this article.

1971 Tasmania experienced a net migration which was most pronounced
in the fifteen to twenty-four year age group (Karmel, 3.10), and that
small tertiary institutions are expensive to run (Karmel, 6.1). i.e. the
student would have learned many things, but things generally locatable
within disciplines. I-Dworkand curriculum then, is complex and difficult,
but at least something of the conceptual basis and structure contributed
by the various disciplines can be understood. And to the extent that we
can understand the contributory disciplines, to that extent we have some
possibility of understanding an I-D approach. To the extent that we can
understand such things as the economic assessments and assumptions the
education value judgments, the statistical projections in ,the Ka~mel
Report on Tasmanian tertiary education, to that extent can we follow
the evidence and understand the recommendations. The logic of the
connections between the evidence and the recommendations may of
course be a further matter but I cannot discuss that here.
Can the same sort of claim just made for I-D work be made for
integration?
It certainly sounds as though whatever it is that is 'integrated' is more
permanently mixed or meshed than whatever is achieved in an I-D fashion.
But what is being 'integrated' in a so-called 'integrated study' or
'integrated curriculum'? I can understand what things are being integrated
when mathematicians use integration in the calculus; many small movements become a large movement, many infinitesimal changes in position
become a curve, and so on. I can understand what has gone on before a
bomb dis-integrates; a steel casing is made to surround a set of chemicals
of a potentially explosive combination. I can understand what is meant
by racial integration; South Africa's Cape coloureds provide a good instance.
There, miscegenation between slaves, Hottentots, early white inhabitants
of the Cape, and sailors on the town in Capetown has produced a unique
racial mixture, or has achieved racial integration. The opposite of racial
integration is presumably South Africa's present Apartheid policy where
races are segregated rather than integrated.

In I-D work, the nature of the claims and statements from the
disciplines will remain the same in the suggested solution to the problem
or in the attainment of understanding of a topic, so that an analysis of
any conclusions reached or points of view held after an I-D study will
show various disciplinary facts and assertions meshed or woven in some
way, but still retaining their original character. For instance, the finished
town plan will be a complex mixture of statistics, economic claims,
artistic value judgements, moralizing at various levels of sophistication,
claims about historic worth of buildings, scientific statements of a
physical, botanical, biological, geological sort, and so on. The recent
report on post-secondary education in Tasmania (Karmel, 1976) was an
I-D study, consisting of claims about educational worth, economic
assessments, assumptions and generalizations, statistical tables of
population distribution and growth, statistical projections, sociological
evidence, hypotheses and arguments, and psychological assumptions.
(I assume that statements about educational worth are themselves mixed
and I-D, being complex meshes of philosophical, psychological, moral,
sociological etc. considerations; so we have I-D work in at least two
levels in education reports, which is just one cause of their contentious
and equivocal nature). If the Karmel report were set for study as part
of a curriculum, what would be encountered by a student would be
various sociological/historical facts, economic generalizations, and so on.
For instance a student may claim to have learned that between 1966 and

In these sorts of contexts I can understand what is meant by the
word, 'integration', and what things are being integrated. I can also understand something about the resulting product; a curve, a bomb, a new
racial type. But just what. is to be made of the suggestions about
curriculum 'integration'? Equivalent to the small movements the
infinitesimal changes, the steel and chemicals, the different racial types,
there will be various pieces of knowledge drawn from the various disciplines such as botany or history. But in place of the large movement,
the curve, the bomb, the new racial type, what is there supposed to be?
A new knowledge acquired, a new unity of learning, a new discipline?
In short, What is the epistemological thesis underlying talk about
curriculum integration? Can we, logically can we, provide children with
new sorts of knowledge and understanding through doing something
called 'integration' in the curriculum? Or do we in fact have precisely
the same sort of result as we have when we approach the school's
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curriculum problems and topics in what we say is an I-D curriculum?
Do we in short have in schools the acquisition of the same learning and
end-products as we have with I-D work or curriculum, but we give it a
new and fancier name 'integration' or 'integrated curriculum'? Here it
may be important to ~ote that I am referring only to what goes on in
schools under the name, 'integration'. I am not referring to curriculum
pursuits and learning acquired in the more rarefied reaches of academic
work where something that perhaps may sensibly be called 'inlegration'
is occurring, where new subjects with a fair degree of rigour may be
emerging. For instance, environmental science, which attempts to describe
the laws governing the interaction of the biological and the physical
environments and which deals with the contact area between biology
and chemistry, perhaps appropriately may be called an integrated study.
Therefore that part of the curriculum of a college in which it occurs may
be called an integrated curriculum. But I think it is manifest that this
is not the sort of thing that goes on in schools: the subject that goes under
that name in schools being merely a mesh of separate scientific disciplines
(see below).
Perhaps the issues can be made a little clearer through an examination
of the nature of knowledge types. This is a vast project so a quick analysis
or resume will be liable to indulge in over-simplification and misinterpretation. Nevertheless, I think that some brief examination of the nature of
knowledge types is necessary if there is to be even a minimal understanding
of the concepts of 'I-D' and 'integration' in the school curriculum.
Probably the two best known and most widely canvassed epistemological
schemes in school curriculum theory are those of Phenix (1964) and Hirst
(1965, 1966, 1970, 1974). There seem to me to be certain logical flaws
in Phenix's analysis which rule it out (see Hirst, 1974, 57), and in what
follows I shall be assuming that Hirst's approach is approximately on the
right lines.
Hirst's thesis can be put quite succinctly in the claim that all human
knowledge and understanding can on analysis be reduced to a number of
discrete and mutually-irreducible types, distinguishable on the basis of
concepts unique to them and of tests for the truth of propositions within
them. Hirst nominates seven such basic forms (basic in the sense that they
are what our conceptual understanding makes clear now, not basic in the
sense that there can never be further forms evolved). They are pure
mathematics and logic, science, knowledge of minds, moral knowledge,
aesthetic knowledge, religion, philosophy. What appear to be further
sorts of knowledge will then be, according to Hirst, complex mixtures
of these fundamental types, and all human knowledge and understanding
will necessarily presuppose such basic types, as will all human enquiry
that goes in search of knowledge and understanding.

and it will be this conceptual structure and the truth criterion for making
claims about it that give it its special quality. Everyday and commonsense knowledge will therefore also have the features Hirst indicates. It is
just because we accept commonsense knowledge so easily and without
question that makes it seem different in type from the knowledge contained in Hirst's seemingly more abstruse and academic forms. But the
taking of commonsense knowledge for granted does not make it any
different; nor does its unorganised appearance, since any particular aspect
or proposition will still lie within a form. Quite esoteric and abstruse
claims of science can become as though they were commonsense for the
researcher at the fringes of his discipline, and can be taken just as much
for granted by him as things assumed true by the first year infant school
child. Five year old Johnny may say that the red stone is hard and the
white rubber is soft, while Professor Herbert Dingle (1972) may argue
that Einstein 'got some of his sums wrong' in the theory of special
relativity, but they are both making claims about the empirical world and
to that extent they are in the realms of natural science. A distinguished
philosopher of science has put the connection between everyday
knowledge and disciplined knowledge in this way: HA study of the
working of science must begin with a study of the language of description
and explanation. We must begin with the logically simplest kinds of
descriptions and explanations - those we formu late in everyday language
to deal with everyday situations. H(Harre, 1960, p.7.) Similar claims
about a continuum between everyday knowledge and more sophisticated
knowledge can be made with respect to the knowledge of the other
forms. In view of the usual claim that infants' teachers are not concerned
with the disciplines, it is revealing to look at what goes on in an infant
school class in these terms: when they are manipulating Dienes rods
children are working within the form, mathematics; when watching a
plant grow from a seed in wet cottonwool, or when engaging in sand and
water play they are beginning to develop scientific understanding; when
watching a friend at play to try to decide his intentions, or when making a
decision of his own, a child is beginning to have knowledge of minds;
when learning to take turns, children are in the moral realm; when they
act out a nursery rhyme or paint a poster colour picture they are squarely
within the aesthetic area; and when they say a prayer at morning assembly
they are engaging in at least some sort of religious exercise. The children
themselves will not make such distinctions explicit of course, and perhaps
neither will the teachers. Nevertheless the children will be working within
these forms of knowledge.

Hirst is not referring only to organised or disciplined knowledge; the
thesis applies to knowledge of everyday affairs and commonsense
knowledge. After all, any item of knowledge, whatever its level of sophistication or abstraction, must involve a conceptual structure of some sort

Hirst's analysis, while doubtlessly questionable as to some details,
makes a good case for the existence of a number of irreducibly distinct
forms of knowledge, and the disciplines as usually understood such as
botany and history, will be either branches of a form (botany is a branch
of science) or else complex mixes of two or more forms (history is a mix
of knowledge of minds and of science, as outlined below). By saying,
'questionable as to some details', I mean that we can ask questions about
the nature of the truth criterion for our knowledge of minds, and about
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whether works of art make artistic statements that are analogous, say, to
scientific statements. I do not mean that the thesis can be questioned in
the way some writers in the sociology of knowledge have somewhat
simplistically questioned it by saying that all knowledge is culture-relative.
Learning in an 1-0 curriculum brings these disciplines to a focus on a
problem or topic of interest. Hirst's analysis has been outlined in an
attempt to answer the question, "Do we in short have in scho01s the same
learning from the same sort of curriculum as with 1-0 work, but we give
it the new and fancier name, 'integration'?" Now if the term, 'integration'
in 'integrated studies' or 'integrated curriculum' had a meaning in a school
curriculum distinct from the meaning that can be attached to the term,
'1-0', such meaning would have to attach to the new unity of the learning
that was to be derived or achieved. This new unity would be analogous to
the new unity produced from disparate racial types through miscegenation,
or to the unified curve that integration produces from small movements
in the calculus. I suggest that'there is no such analogy in the curriculum of
the school student. Of course it is not fundamentally important whether
we use one name or two for the learning that is acquired in an 1-0 curriculum. What is important is that we should be aware of the epistemological
foundations of the things we teach in schools, so that we can have a proper
basis for decisions we make about what learning should feature in a school's
curriculum. But names can lead us astray in our expectations and in our
beliefs about the foundations, and more importantly perhaps, in our
beliefs about the possible curriculum arrangements that we can make.
I suggest that the term, 'integration' leads us astray in just these ways.
This is why I want to use only the term, '1-0' and to drop the term
'integration' from school curriculum discussions, with perhaps the possible
exception of a special usesuggested below.

hypotheses such as, 'the higher our altitude, the stronger our eyesight';
hypotheses that can quickly be shown, to anyone interested in truth,
objectivity and reason, to be false. I introduced this example of knowledge
because I said that it is not possible to reconstruct the curriculum just as
we like, if we are in fact concerned with knowledge. The fact that the
earth is spherical is not an isolated fact, but one that interrelates with a
host of other empirical truths that fall within the fundamental form,
science. Thus to know that the earth is spherical is to know something that
is fundamental to a rational understanding of one's place in the universe.
And in Hirst's analysis all knowledge is so traceable to its place within
one of the fundamental forms.
I,

Hirst's thesis has further important implications for the curriculum,
that must be discussed at this point. A number of advocates of curriculum
integration believe that any curriculum organization is as acceptable as any
other, but Hirst's thesis would seem to give the lie to such a claim. His
thesis indicates that it is not possible to reconstruct the curriculum just as
anyone likes because the nature of the fundamentals of the knowledge
that is to be 'acquired are in a sense, given, and cannot be disregarded if we
are to be concerned with the acquisition of know/edge rather than with
indulgence in fancy or irrationality. "All knowledge occurs within some
logical structure which is what it is. There simply is no such thing as
knowledge which is not locatable within some such organisation. "(Hirst,
1974, p.135). The term 'knowledge' in the present discussion is akin to
'justified true belief', knowledge being connected with objectivity, truth
and reason. For example, someone possesses knowledge when he says
that the earth is spherical. He knows that the earth is spherical and we
can all agree that he is in possession of knowledge, not because any
particular person has said so, but because it is so, because it can be shown
so by a myriad of mutually-supporting experiments tied to the world of
experience. The 'flat-earthers' just are wrong. Their flat-earth thesis c~~ be
sustained only through the introduction of the most preposterous auxIliary

None of the 'integrated' approaches to the school curriculum has
achieved a new unity of knowledge. All they appear to have produced
is a new mesh or aggregation drawn ultimately from various branches
of the different forms of knowledge, new meshes or aggregations that
are certainly 1-0, but only I-D. Advocates of 'integration' see these
same meshes or aggregations as 'integration' only because they have
not exam ined the epistemological presuppositions of their position
sufficiently - what it would be for knowledge to be integrated.
makes use of another form. Of course it does. Indeed one form may be
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We have several fundamental forms because, in order to deal with the
real world, conceptual structures have had to be separated out alongside
the truth tests that both support the structure and help inform the
structure. When we re-organize the curriculum ~ if we are indeed concerned
with knowledge, we merely reorganize the ways in which the fundamental
structures are acquired; we delude ourselves if we believe otherwise. And
I take it that we must be concerned with knowledge because knowledge
is so fundamental in human activity; knowledge is essential for a properlygrounded understanding of our situation in the world, but not just any
sort of knowledge: knowledge rather of the fundamental types that
structure our understanding and upon which we necessarily draw day by
day. After all, even the affective areas of human endeavour have their
knowledge core. So an attack on the structure of the curriculum may be
completely acceptable, but will have certain epistemological limits. An
attack on the knowledge foundations that underpin any curriculum will
be misplaced. Some curriculum theorists have mistakenly thought that
the first is possible only by way of the second (Hirst, 1974, p.139).

Of f:Ourse I am not suggesting that one form of knowledge never
logically necessary for progress in another form. But to be logically
necessary is not to be logically sufficient. It may be that no serious progress
in physical science could have occurred without an appropriate development in mathematics, but that does not mean that scientific knowledge
and understanding is reducible to mathematics. Phenix makes this point
when he writes that the
... decisive difference is that in empirical science the deductions must
finally be checked against observations. In mathematics the only
requirement is internal consistency within any given theory. In empirical

science the chain of propositions must also be consistent with the
results of actual physical measurements. (1964, p.1 02).
For instance the physicist may 'idealize' a mechanical problem by putting
it into purely mathematical terms. The 'idealized' problem can then
yield a solution. But the solution must then be verified by experim.ents in
physics. Again, it may well be that we cannot draw moral conclusions or
make moral judgments without reference to various scientific facts about
the world but this does not turn our moral judgment into a scientific
one. Thes~ kinds of interrelationships between our knowledge of different
forms are manifest and multitudinous, but they are not evidence for any
supposed 'integrationist' thesis about the school curriculum. The conceptual scheme and the truth criteria are peculiar to the one form of
knowledge alone, whatever use we may make of knowledge drawn from
the other forms.
Having outlined Hirst's thesis, it will be clear that such a subject .as
environmental science, mentioned earlier, while no doubt new, and while
providing something of a new unity, is still within the overall form of
science. It does not overlap forms of knowledge. It may well be that such
new areas are necessary if we are to continue to have developments in our
knowledge - progress would clearly seem to be possible at the interfaces
between branches of a form. Thus new subjects may be breaking down the
distinctions between subjects and diciplines, but they are not breaking
down the distinctions between forms; we are getting new sub-forms, not
new forms or 'integrations' across forms. And what is apposite to the
present article is that none of this applies to the work done in a school
curriculum.
If the use of the term 'integration' were to mean the use of scientific
facts to make moral judgements, the use of mathematical tools .in drawing
scientific conclusions, and so on, then there would be a meanmg.for the
term 'integration', but equally there would be nothing new, nothmg that
we have not had in the most 'traditional', 'conservative', 'subject-centred'
curriculum. In other words when meaningfully used, the term would not
be doing the sort of work it was presumably introduced by curriculum
theorists to do. Furthermore it would be confusing since it could then
be claimed that the same sch~oi curriculum was both subject-centred and
'integrated" .
There is perhaps a way' in which the term, 'integration' can be given
another quite meaningful use at the level of school curriculum talk.
It might be suggested that it be used when reference is being made to some
of those studies that are already well-established in schools but which are
not as logically-basic as Hirst's seven forms of knowledge or the
subdivisions within these forms, and which were referred to above as
"well-established and 1-0". Hirst calls these sort of studies fields of
knowledge and practical theories of knowledge (Hirst, 1965, 1966).
Fields of knowledge are grouped around some common interest or topic,
while practical theories of knowledge have the additional unifying purpose
of a practical concern. 'Our Neighbourhood', 'Modern European Man',
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'Pollution', geography and history are fields; medicine, home economics
and educational theory are practical theories. My suggestion is that we
perhaps call the well-established fields such as history and geography,
'integrated studies' rather than just 1-0 studies. Such subjects have a
long tradition of maintained study, well-established disciplinary names,
and the man in the street has some notion of what they are, but they
are different in logical type from forms or divisions of forms; they are
not as logically-basic. The term, 'integration' may be appropriate in their
case because they are meaningful wholes unified around the 'methodological' concepts of time and space: of happening through time and of
organization across space. This is not to say that history and: geography
are logical wholes in the way that a form of knowledge or a branch of a
form is a logical whole. It is to say that the 'methodological' foundations
connected with the development over time and organization through
space bring together the more fundamental material deriving from the
forms of knowledge, and of which history and geography consist, into a
meaningful 'psychological' whole or unity.
That a study such as history can perhaps be regarded meaningfully
as an integrated study because a 'psychological' whole, can be shown
by briefly analyzing its features. History studies historical events.
Historical events take place across periods of time. Historical events
include the Battle of Actium, life on the Ballarat goldfields, Mohammad's
Hegira, Galileo's scientific experiments, World War I. Broad or narrow,
these are historical events to be explained in an historical way. Historians
describe, explain, interpret and relate events one to another, attempting
to see them as wholes and to outline the circumstances and causes
surrounding, and the reasons for actions taken by human beings in the
past. In history, the individual pieces are important for their own sake
as objects of knowledge also. The historian is distinguished from other
scholars not only because he is interested in happenings through time,
but also because of the emphasis he places upon the role of individual
motives, actions, accomplishments, failures and contingencies. It is these
that give historical events their 'inside'. It is these that make history
different from a mere empirical or scientific study and give it the
dimension that in Hirst's terms lies within the form, knowledge of minds.
Historians, whenever it is appropriate, give explanations in terms of
motives and reasons, not just of causes. In history it is often appropriate
to ask why certain people acted as they did and to answer at a level
different from that at which the phenomena of rocks and animals are
explained. We understand what it is to have purposes of our own, what it
is to strive, what it is to be a human being, but with rocks and animals
it cannot be claimed that there are inner workings that are understandable.
The second dimension to history is of course the scientific one. While it
is true that historians describe past events and in that sense there isn't
anything 'there' in the way the scientist's material is (usually) there, there
is no difference in principle between this aspect of the historian's work
and the work of scientists. Certainly the historian deals with the past but
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the past is not an epistemologically-fundamental category. It has to be
interpreted from the evidence which remains, but to the extent that it has
left evidence that is accessible, the past is accessible in the way that the
present is accessible to the scientist. The historian, like the scie~tist h~s an
hypothesis in mind. When this requ ires more than reference to intentions,
decisions and beliefs of individuals, he can get the help of archaeology,
numismatics, palaeography, sigillography, chemistry and so on, through
both their procedures and their established laws and theories, to draw their
historical conclusions. In brief, the argument is that history is a complex
inter-relationship of the more logically-fundamental forms, knowledge of
minds and science. The historian's final output of article or book is a
largely ordinary - language kind of description and explanation using
these more basic forms of knowledge. But because of the given 'methodological' background of connection and development through time, there
is no forced joining of these contributory forms.
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This is why I think it can be suggested that the term, 'integration'
perhaps can be appropriately applied to a subject such as history at the
school curriculum level. It seems that a similar case for calling geography
at the school level an integrated study can be made, and perhaps a case
for some of the other well-established fields of knowledge that have
traditionally featured as school subjects. However I do not think that such
a case can be constructed for such curriculum groupings as "Our
Neighbourhood", or "Modern European Man". Stud ies such as these are
fields in Hirst's sense, but lack the 'psychological' and 'methodological'
unity provided in history and geography by connections across time and
space, which give the term 'integration' some meaning. Th~y are I-D
studies consisting of propositions, claims, arguments, assumptions of the
sort earlier suggested as characterizing town plans or educational reports.
They will themselves involve the more integrated statements and
arguments of history and geography.

Although I have rejected as redundant or misapplied, the usual use of
the term, 'integration', it is important that I emphasize that I ~m in no
way opposed to properly-directed I-D studies. Indeed, I believe that
certain I-D work in the school curriculum (as in moral and sex education)
is of extreme importance. But a superficial understanding of the epistemology, a misdirected enthusiasm and a glib use of the term, 'integra~ion' may
do more harm than good to the important cause of I-D studies In schools
- the sort of harm indicated in the example of European studies at my
last college, mentioned at the beginning of this article. For unlike the
issues with which, say, the Karmel Report in Tasmania had to deal, issues
which could only be approached in an I-D way, the EUropean studies
course had no problem to solve, no issues to decide, not even an organizing
focus or real centre of interest. Its reason for existence was the worst of
all educational reasons - educational fashion.
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